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ATTORNEYS, E-DISCOVERY,
AND THE CASE FOR 37(G)
Marilyn G. Mancusi*
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, an average breach-of-contract case turned into a
“quagmire of adversarialism”—all because of the incompetence of one
attorney.1 When the opposing party submitted discovery requests, the
attorney was obligated to communicate with IT personnel about what
reasonable steps should be taken to preserve potentially relevant
information.2 Yet “[t]here was no timely notice given to the IT
department.”3 When the attorney finally advised the client to preserve
relevant documents, the advice was “halfhearted” and “wholly
inadequate” because he gave “little or no guidance or direction” to the
client.4 According to the court, “[i]t is hard to imagine a circumstance
in which [these] steps to preserve ESI would have been considered
reasonable.”5 This seems like an obvious case for the imposition of
sanctions or discipline, but the attorney got away with it. The court
imposed monetary sanctions on the client but failed to discipline the
attorney in any way.6 Unfortunately, this is a circumstance that

* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2023; B.A. in
Communications, Governors State University, 2019; A.A.S. in Administrative Assistant, Fox
College, 2016. I express my gratitude to Professor Emily S. Bremer, who advised me on this
Note and introduced me to the incredible subject of Civil Procedure. I express further
thanks to Professors Jay Tidmarsh, Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, and Veronica Root Martinez for
the time they spent reading my rough draft and providing valuable feedback. To my
friends, family, and fellow members of Notre Dame Law Review: thank you for your
unwavering love and support. I appreciate you more than you know. All errors are my own.
All glory be to God.
1 EPAC Techs., Inc. v. HarperCollins Christian Publ’g, Inc., No. 12-cv-00463, 2018
WL 1542040, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2018).
2 Id. at *7.
3 Id.
4 Id. at *18, *22.
5 Id. at *22.
6 Id. at *29. In the state public discipline search, the attorney has no record of public
discipline and appears to have retired recently. Attorney Details, BD. PRO. RESP. SUP. CT.
TENN., https://www.tbpr.org/attorneys/003778 [https://perma.cc/4M2S-H78D].
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happens far too often, because courts do not have a reliable, uniform
system authorizing them to impose sanctions on attorneys who violate
their e-discovery obligations.
There are currently various sources of authority that federal
courts can invoke to sanction attorneys who bungle their e-discovery
obligations, but each is insufficient. All fifty states have their own rules
authorizing courts within the state to refer misbehaving attorneys to
the local disciplinary body, but each state’s rule is different, leading to
much inconsistency and lack of uniformity among the federal courts.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) address e-discovery
abuse but do not authorize courts to impose sanctions on attorneys for
their role in e-discovery abuse. This is a problem because attorneys
have ethical and professional obligations to preserve evidence and
advise clients on what information needs to be preserved and how.
Many failures to properly preserve ESI can be traced back to the lawyer.
This obligation is especially important today, where much evidence
and information is found through various electronic forms.
Something must be done to provide predictability, uniformity, and
efficiency for courts when imposing sanctions for e-discovery
violations. Because ESI is so important to discovery, and because
attorneys play such a major role in the discovery process, the FRCP
should add a Rule giving courts authority to impose sanctions against
attorneys who act improperly in e-discovery.
Part I of this Note will discuss the history of discovery and the rise
of e-discovery as technology gathered steam. Part II will explain the
benefits and costs of technology and e-discovery, and the various
ethical obligations and common law expectations that attorneys
currently have when it comes to e-discovery. Part III will review several
sources of authority that federal courts have used in the past to impose
sanctions on attorneys for their role in e-discovery abuse. Part IV will
propose a new Rule to be added to the FRCP, which would give federal
courts a uniform, reliable system of imposing e-discovery sanctions on
attorneys. Part IV will continue with a discussion of the shortcomings
of other suggested solutions and potential concerns with a new FRCP
Rule.
I.

THE HISTORY OF DISCOVERY AND RISE OF E-DISCOVERY

Discovery originated in equity and was historically only available
to litigants at common law after they obtained a writ of discovery from
the Court of Chancery.7 Few litigants took advantage of this practice,

7 See Patricia I. McMahon, Rediscovering the Equitable Origins of Discovery: The ‘Blending’
of Law and Equity Prior to Fusion, in EQUITY AND LAW: FUSION AND FISSION 280, 280 (John

2022]

ATTORNEYS, E-DISCOVERY, AND THE CASE FOR 37(G)

2229

however, and those who did were only allowed limited discovery tools.8
Discovery was likely so rare because litigation was commonly seen as a
process that was less “a rational quest for truth, but rather a method by
which society could determine which side God took to be truthful or
just.”9 Courts rejected the idea that parties should be rifling through
each other’s files to search for evidence related to the lawsuit.10 There
was no defined process to search for facts and organize evidence,11 and
only a handful of federal statutes entitled litigants to any discovery
rights.12 Otherwise, parties would appear in court, state the facts as
they believed them to be, and hope the judge would decide that their
story was more “truthful [and] just” than the opposing party.13 By the
mid-1800s, however, discovery became a much more popular practice
in suits at common law due to the fusion of equity and law in several
state courts.14 “The idea of hiding relevant facts and documents from
the other side and from the judge and/or jury ma[de] little sense, and
there [were] numerous examples in which broad discovery [was]
crucial to arriving at a just result.”15
Then, in 1935, a committee was appointed to draft a uniform set
of discovery rules “through which parties could ‘obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.’”16 That

C.P. Goldberg, Henry E. Smith & P.G. Turner eds., 2019); Jay Tidmarsh, Opting Out of
Discovery, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1807 (2018).
8 Tidmarsh, supra note 7, at 1807.
9 Scott M. O’Brien, Note, Analog Solutions: E-Discovery Spoliation Sanctions and the
Proposed Amendments to FRCP 37(E), 65 DUKE L.J. 151, 157 (2015) (quoting Stephen N.
Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery
Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 695 (1998)).
10 Subrin, supra note 9, at 697 (referring to such searches as a “fishing expedition”).
11 O’Brien, supra note 9, at 157 (explaining that parties couldn’t submit interrogatories, depositions were to be conducted at trial before the judge, and only the opposing party
could be deposed).
12 Subrin, supra note 9, at 698–701 (One statute permitted de bene esse, which were
conditional depositions allowed when the witness was unable to attend trial. Another
statute permitted dedimus potestatem, depositions permitted when justice demanded it.
Additional rules permitted depositions and interrogatories in certain circumstances for
cases in courts of equity.).
13 O’Brien, supra note 9, at 157.
14 Tidmarsh, supra note 7, at 1807. New York was the first state to adopt a code of civil
procedure that fused law and equity. Thirty more states followed suit in the decades that
followed. See Kellen Funk, Equity Without Chancery: The Fusion of Law and Equity in the Field
Code of Civil Procedure, New York 1846–76, 36 J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 152 (2015).
15 Subrin, supra note 9, at 740.
16 Id. at 710; O’Brien, supra note 9, at 157 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
501 (1947)). See also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507 (“[D]iscovery rules are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
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uniform set of discovery rules became what is now known as the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). Finalized in 1938, the
FRCP officially merged law and equity in the federal courts.17 The
FRCP included a Rule on discovery, designed “to narrow the issues for
trial, to lead to the discovery of evidence, and to foster an exchange of
information which may lead to an early settlement.”18
At that time and for the next several decades, most business
records were in paper format, so when litigation arose, attorneys and
their clients would rummage “through the[ir] paper documents to
find relevant [information].”19 Then, in the 1990s, technology
changed the way litigants approached discovery. “[T]he advent of
email and desktop computers resulted in an explosion of electronic
documents,” and the increased volume of information revolutionized
discovery.20 The FRCP responded with amendments in 200621 and
201522 to address the many issues and questions that came with new
technology and electronic evidence.23 In particular, Rule 26 was
amended to require discovery of electronically stored information

litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has
in his possession.”).
17 Tidmarsh, supra note 7, at 1833 n.140.
18 Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, E-Discovery Today: The Fault Lies Not in Our Rules . . . ,
4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 131, 139 (2011) (quoting Westhemeco Ltd. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D.
702, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
19 Damian Vargas, Electronic Discovery: 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 34 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 396, 397 (2008).
20 Paula Schaefer, Attorneys, Document Discovery, and Discipline, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1, 8 (2017).
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. Additional
changes addressed relevance, which party bears the costs, what happens to documents that
are not reasonably accessible, and the requirement that e-discovery be discussed at the
pretrial conference.
22 The 2015 amendments didn’t make many changes beyond the 2006 e-discovery
amendments. They addressed some over-arching discovery issues that had arisen over the
past decade. Schaefer, supra note 20, at 8; FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to
2015 amendment; FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; FED.
R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
23 O’Brien, supra note 9, at 159–60. (“As computer systems became central to business
operations . . . judges struggled to apply the discovery rules developed prior to the
computer revolution . . . . It became clear that . . . existing discovery rules did not provide
effective guidance for the courts and parties.”).
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(ESI)24 because “discovery of [ESI] stands on equal footing with
discovery of paper documents.”25
Today, that statement still rings true. If anything, discovery of ESI
(“e-discovery”) is more important than discovery of paper documents.
E-discovery “can be a game changer in any type of litigation”26 and “has
already proven to be an extremely effective tool for uncovering critical
evidence that would otherwise be concealed, thus playing a vital role
in the search for truth.”27 This “critical” evidence can be found in a
variety of forms: emails, text messages, Google searches, social media
posts and messages, and PDFs, to name a few.28 The amount of
potentially discoverable ESI is only growing. The number of people
using the internet worldwide has increased from 2.6 billion in 2013 to
4.66 billion in early 2021.29 In 2021, about 65% of the world’s
population—5.17 billion people—had access to the internet.30 In
2010, about 294 billion emails were sent per day.31 It is estimated that
number will increase to 361 billion emails sent per day in 2024.32 Every
second of every day, the average person creates over 1.7 megabytes of
data.33 Each of these megabytes may be discoverable information in
24 FRCP 34 defines ESI as any information stored electronically, and the purpose of
the broad definition is to include all types of computer-based information at that time, and
to anticipate any future developments. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2006
amendment.
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment; Milberg LLP &
Hausfeld LLP, supra note 18, at 142 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note
to 2006 amendment).
26 Thomas Roe Frazer II, Social Media: From Discovery to Marketing—A Primer for
Lawyers, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 539, 541 (2013).
27 Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, supra note 18, at 140.
28 Text messages have recently become more important sources of ESI. Many workers
now use texting as their “preferred mode of communication.” William Vogeler, The Legal
Cost of Deleted Text Messages, FINDLAW (Aug. 1, 2017) https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs
/in-house/the-legal-cost-of-deleted-text-messages/ [https://perma.cc/XJL2-NP9M]; Text
Message Discovery: How to Correctly Handle Text Messages (and Avoid Spoliation Sanctions),
TELIOS TEACHES, https://teliosteaches.com/blog/text-message-discovery-how-correctlyhandle-text-messages-and-avoid-spoliation-sanctions [https://perma.cc/5X7S-98YU].
29 Jacquelyn Bulao, How Much Data is Created Every Day in 2021?, TECHJURY (Feb. 6,
2022), https://techjury.net/blog/how-much-data-is-created-every-day/#gref [https://
perma.cc/7APF-CA8B].
30 Data Never Sleeps 9.0, DOMO, https://www.domo.com/learn/infographic/datanever-sleeps-9 [https://perma.cc/QN2H-DWTK] [hereinafter Data Never Sleeps].
31 Kathryn Kinnison Van Namen, Comment, Facebook Facts and Twitter Tips—
Prosecutors and Social Media: An Analysis of the Implications Associated with the Use of Social Media
in the Prosecution Function, 81 MISS. L.J. 549, 550 (2012).
32 Bulao, supra note 29.
33 Id. For reference, one megabyte is about one 100-page document or one minute
of audio. Anthony Wagner, A Very Quick Guide to Understanding File Sizes, LIGHTNING TECH.
(Apr. 7, 2019), https://lightningdetroit.com/a-very-quick-guide-to-understanding-file-sizes
/ [https://perma.cc/4AKV-A7ZC].
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future litigation, showing just how vast ESI has become. Electronic
data has now become “commonplace in our professional and everyday
lives,”34 leaving a “digital trail” that grows “immeasurably” every day.35
Social media, too, is a growing source of ESI. Today, about onethird of the world’s population uses some form of social media.36 Over
2.5 billion people are active Facebook users.37 Every minute, at least
65,000 photos are shared on Instagram; 2 million snaps are sent
through Snapchat; 575,000 tweets are posted on Twitter; and 167
million TikTok videos are watched.38 Social media use “has become
the rule, rather than the exception.”39 It is “not a fad or frivolity, but
a paradigm shift sweeping both the legal profession and society at
large.”40 Social media produces “a treasure trove of discoverable
information”41 that is “unquestionably . . . [ESI] in the same sense as
e-mail and electronic documents.”42
II.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF ESI AND ATTORNEY OBLIGATIONS IN EDISCOVERY
A. The Benefits of Technology Come with Great Costs

Though e-discovery has taken a preeminent place in the discovery
process, it is not without issues. Businesses benefit greatly from
technology, because electronic storage is cheaper and more efficient
than paper storage, and electronic data is overall easier to organize,
access, and store.43 But these benefits come with great costs. First,
huge amounts of data are stored in various places and formats.44
34 John E. Motylinski, E-Discovery Realpolitik: Why Rule 37(E) Must Embrace Sanctions,
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1605, 1610 (2015).
35 Frazer, supra note 26, at 541.
36 Brian A. Zemil, Ethics and Social Media Discovery, A.B.A. (Jan. 15, 2021), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/civil-procedure
/ethics-and-social-media-discovery/ [https://perma.cc/G2DB-4DS5].
37 Id.
38 Data Never Sleeps, supra note 30.
39 John G. Browning, “You Tweeted What?” Ethics of Advising Your Clients About Their
Social Media Posts, in 13th Annual Advanced Business Law Course, ch. 5 at 1 (2015).
40 Kristen L. Mix, Discovery of Social Media, 40 COLO. LAW. 27, 27 (2011) (quoting
Nicole Black & Carolyn Elefant, Social Media for Solos and Small Firms: What It Is and Why It
Matters, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N J., Feb. 2011, at 18, 18).
41 Van Namen, supra note 31, at 560.
42 Frazer, supra note 26, at 546.
43 Patricia Groot, Electronically Stored Information: Balancing Free Discovery with Limits on
Abuse, 8 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 2, 2009, at ¶ 1, ¶ 5; Matthew M. Neumeier & Brian D.
Hansen, Avoiding the Pitfalls of Electronic Discovery, 1 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. 1, 1 (2003).
44 O’Brien, supra note 9, at 160; Paula Schaefer, Attorney Negligence and Negligent
Spoliation: The Need for New Tools to Prompt Attorney Competence in Preservation, 51 AKRON L.
REV. 607, 615–16 (2017) (ESI is found, for example, on hard drives, tablets, or in the cloud).

2022]

ATTORNEYS, E-DISCOVERY, AND THE CASE FOR 37(G)

2233

Electronic data is saved on desktop computers, company laptops,
digital cameras, email accounts, and USB drives.45 The data might be
saved as a Word document, an Excel spreadsheet, a PowerPoint
presentation, or a PDF file.46 Discoverable data such as text messages,
voicemail messages, and calendar entries are saved on mobile
devices.47 Additional sources of evidence include posts, comments,
and messages on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Pinterest, or
even blogs or other online articles.48 Google Maps and GPS’s track
location, and cell phone apps and games record various personal
information.49 The sheer volume of electronic data and the variety of
places in which it can be found make it difficult for parties in litigation
to know what electronic evidence they have.50
For businesses, e-discovery also constitutes a very costly and timeconsuming process. Many businesses have electronic document
retention policies, and when litigation is anticipated or begins, they are
required to review those retention policies and either alter or
completely halt those policies in order to ensure that all relevant data
to litigation is preserved.51 This can be a “time intensive” process.52
Changing document retention policies and then filtering the
discoverable ESI to determine what documents are relevant is also
quite costly.53 Discovery is a well-known cost-driver in litigation,54 and
45 Andrew D. Goldsmith & Lori A. Hendrickson, Investigations and Prosecutions
Involving Electronically Stored Information, 56 U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL. 27, 29 (2008); see also Wendy
R. Leibowitz, Digital Discovery Starts to Work; Judges Are Getting Involved Early in the Process,
Nat’l L.J., Nov. 2002.
46 Lesley Friedman Rosenthal, Electronic Discovery Can Unearth Treasure Trove of
Information or Potential Land Mines, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N J., Sept. 2003, at 32, 32, 34.
47 Frazer, supra note 26, at 542–44.
48 Id.
49 Id.; Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 32, 34.
50 Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 32.
51 Goldsmith & Hendrickson, supra note 45, at 29.
52 Id.
53 O’Brien, supra note 9, at 160–61.
54 See THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, IN THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS
ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 14 (2010). Costs can be so
high because the producing party is the one who usually bears the cost, so the requesting
party has little incentive to limit the production request. Motylinski, supra note 34, at 1615.
Further, parties tend to over-preserve and over-discover information that might be relevant
in the case, for fear of sanctions if they destroy or fail to discover some relevant evidence.
This over-preservation just adds more to costs. See id. at 1617–18; O’Brien, supra note 9, at
154. The FRCP requires discovery requests to be relevant, but since discovery often happens
before the facts and claims are fully understood, relevance is often unclear at the time the
discovery request is made. And for clients who lead the initial charge (supervised by their
lawyer) in looking for relevant documents, they don’t always fully understand the legal
claims and don’t know what’s relevant. This uncertainty leads to more over-preservation
and, therefore, more discovery costs. See Schaefer, supra note 44, at 617–18; John G.
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production of e-discovery in particular pushes costs even higher.55 In
2015, the average discovery cost for cases in federal courts was just over
$4000,56 but one 2018 study estimated that the average discovery cost
per case for large corporations was at least $1 million.57
Finally, ESI is easily altered or deleted. The nature of electronic
evidence makes it “transitory—easily lost, overwritten, or modified.”58
Text messages, social media posts and comments, and voicemails can
be deleted with the tap of a few buttons. Documents saved on a
computer can be deleted with just a click or two of the mouse.59
Businesses also often have implemented automatic email deletion
policies.60 Sometimes ESI is deleted or altered “without the user’s
knowledge.”61

Browning, Burn After Reading: Preservation and Spoliation of Evidence in the Age of Facebook, 16
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 273, 280, 290 (2013). Additionally, factors such as factual and
procedural complexity, stakes of the case, size of the law firm, and wealth of the litigants
can inflate litigation and discovery costs. See WILLGING & LEE, supra note 54, at 3, 6, 7, 11.
55 See WILLGING & LEE, supra note 54, at 14, 16 (“[P]laintiffs who requested ESI had
37% higher costs and plaintiffs who requested and produced ESI had 48% higher costs. . . .
Defendants who requested and produced ESI had a 17% increase in costs. . . . For both
plaintiffs and defendants, however, each dispute about ESI was associated with a 10–11%
increase in costs.”).
56 Robert Hilson, How Much Does eDiscovery Cost the U.S Every Year?, LOGIKCULL (July
20, 2015), https://www.logikcull.com/blog/estimating-the-total-cost-of-u-s-ediscovery
[https://perma.cc/66FW-AC8Y].
57 Eleanor Brock, eDiscovery Opportunity Costs: What Is the Most Efficient Approach?,
LOGIKCULL (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.logikcull.com/blog/ediscovery-opportunitycosts-infographic.[https://perma.cc/S8DY-T4QE]. For a detailed summary of litigation
and discovery costs for large corporations, see Lawyers for Civil Justice, Civil Justice Reform
Group, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Statement for Presentation to Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Litigation
Cost Survey of Major Companies (May 10–11, 2010).
58 Arthur L. Smith, Responding to the “E-Discovery Alarm”: Planning Your Response to a
Litigation Hold, 17 BUS. L. TODAY 27, 27 (2007); see also Motylinski, supra note 34, at 1614
and Schaefer, supra note 44, at 615. But at the same time, anything posted on the internet
or saved electronically can usually never be deleted forever. Any deleted or altered
information is usually discoverable eventually. But this doesn’t mitigate the fact that ESI is
easily changed, leading to huge opportunities for intentional destruction of evidence. See
Van Namen, supra note 31, at 562.
59 Neumeier & Hansen, supra note 43, at 1 (“In many instances, [electronic
information] can be altered or deleted with a few simple keystrokes.”).
60 In VOOM HD Holdings v. EchoStar Satellite L.L.C., the defendant company had a
computer system which permanently and automatically deleted all emails after seven days.
VOOM HD Holdings LLC v. EchoStar Satellite L.L.C., 939 N.Y.S.2d 321, 326 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2012). A similar situation happened in Mosaid Techs. v. Samsung, where the defendant
company’s computer system automatically deleted emails on a regular basis. Mosaid Techs.
Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 333 (D.N.J. 2004).
61 Motylinski, supra note 34, at 1614. For example, in NuVasive, Inc. v. Kormanis, a
party was unaware that her relevant and otherwise-discoverable text messages were being
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“Spoliation” is the term used to broadly describe this
“destruction, mutilation, alteration, or concealment of evidence” in
discovery.62 There are two types of spoliation: intentional spoliation
(which occurs when a party intends to conceal evidence) and negligent
spoliation (which occurs when a party doesn’t act reasonably to
preserve relevant evidence).63 Both are equally deserving of sanctions,
since, as discussed in the following paragraphs, an attorney has a duty
to not only refrain from concealing evidence, but also to reasonably
act to preserve all relevant evidence.64 Ultimately, the transitory and
ubiquitous nature of ESI leaves it rife with opportunities for
misconduct.
B. Attorneys’ Expectations and Obligations to Clients in Discovery
With the technological boom and its attendant opportunities for
discovery misconduct comes new expectations and professional
obligations for attorneys that govern every aspect of their role as an
advisor in the discovery process.65 Any violation of the following duties
and obligations can constitute misconduct punishable with discipline
or sanctions. What follows are the baseline expectations for every
attorney in the discovery process.
1. Attorneys have ethical obligations in discovery.
The first and “most fundamental” obligation is the obligation to
preserve evidence.66 This obligation is established in each court’s code
of professional conduct. Federal courts usually adopt the professional
code of whatever state they are physically located, and most states have
deleted due to an automatic thirty-day deletion setting. NuVasive, Inc. v. Kormanis, No.
1:8CV282, 2019 WL 1171486, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 13, 2019).
62 Spoliation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Graff v. Baja Marine
Corp., 310 Fed. App’x 298, 301 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)) (“Spoliation is the destruction or significant
alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in
pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.”); see also Paul W. Grimm, Ethical Issues
Associated with Preserving, Accessing, Discovering, and Using Electronically Stored Information, 56
U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL. 1, 5 (2008) (quoting Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590
(4th Cir. 2001)) (“Spoliation refers to the destruction or material alteration of evidence or
to the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably
foreseeable litigation.”).
63 Schaefer, supra note 44, at 608, 608 n.3, 609.
64 Browning, supra note 54, at 282; Schaefer, supra note 20, at 14; Dan H. Willoughby,
Jr., Rose Hunter Jones & Gregory R. Antine, Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 808 (2010) (“modification or destruction of data through
automated and manual file deletions or physical tampering with computer system”).
65 See Schaefer, supra note 20, at 6; Browning, supra note 54, at 274–75.
66 Browning, supra note 54, at 276.
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modeled their professional conduct rules on the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (“RPC”).67
Therefore, “most attorneys
practicing in federal court are obligated to comply with some version
of [the RPC].”68
RPC 3.4 specifically addresses attorney obligations in discovery: a
lawyer cannot “unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence
or unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material
having potential evidentiary value;”69 “knowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal;”70 “make a frivolous discovery request or
fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper
discovery request by an opposing party;”71 or “request a person other
than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to
another party.”72 These obligations are based on the goals of encouraging fair competition in litigation and maintaining the basic
procedural right for both parties to obtain evidence through
discovery.73 Any lawyer whose actions prevent either of these goals
from happening has violated their professional obligations and should
expect some form of discipline or sanctions.
RPC 1.1 is also relevant in discovery, because it requires attorneys
to “provide competent representation to a client,” which “requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.”74 “Competency” is a word that now
encompasses an understanding of technology.75 Because technology
plays a large role in the average person’s everyday life,76 “[i]t seems too
late in the day to argue that a lawyer’s duty of fundamental competence
does not encompass a level of expertise related to digital technology,
especially the information technology systems used by the lawyer’s
client.”77 Of course, competency will vary depending on the facts and

67 Schaefer, supra note 20, at 17; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N
2020). For a comparison of the states’ professional codes to the ABA model rules, see
Jurisdiction Rules Comparison Charts, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/professional_responsibility/policy/rule_charts/ [https://perma.cc/8AU7-QY9H].
68 Schaefer, supra note 20, at 17.
69 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
70 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
71 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
72 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
73 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4 cmts. 1, 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
74 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
75 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“To maintain
requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its
practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology . . . .”).
76 See supra Part I.
77 John Garaffa, Ethics: Concerns About Lawyer Competency in the Brave New World of
Electronic Discovery, BUTLER WEIHMULLER KATZ CRAIG LLP (Aug. 1, 2007), https://
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circumstances of each case and each client, but competency overall
requires a basic comprehension of technological advances.78 For
example, attorneys should be proactive in informing themselves about
their clients’ IT systems so that they can ensure proper preservation in
litigation, and they should also understand whatever technology will
be used in an e-discovery process, and the burden and expense of ediscovery:79
[A] party and her counsel must make certain that all sources of
potentially relevant information are identified and placed “on
hold” . . . . To do this, counsel must become fully familiar with her
client’s document retention policies, as well as the client’s data
retention architecture. This will invariably involve speaking with
information technology personnel . . . .80

This is a real obligation for attorneys, and courts have imposed
sanctions in cases where a failure to understand the client’s technology
system led to destruction of evidence or a delay in discovery.81
Attorneys should also know enough about evolving technology to know
when they need to hire an expert or consultant for assistance with ediscovery.82 Competency also includes knowing who has possession,

www.butler.legal/ethics-concerns-about-lawyer-competency-in-the-brave-new-world-ofelectronic-discovery/ [https://perma.cc/AVA8-DRC5].
78 See, e.g., Philip Favro, eDiscovery and Ethical Considerations for Social Media,
INNOVATIVE DRIVEN (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.driven-inc.com/ediscovery-and-ethicalconsiderations-for-social-media-2/ [https://perma.cc/K5F8-5PR9].
79 Elizabeth E. McGinn & Kristopher Knabe, Ethical Issues in the Digital Age: Navigating
E-Discovery Challenges, 16 CONSUMER LITIG. 7, 7–8 (2012); Tyler D. Trew, Ethical Obligations
in Electronic Discovery, A.B.A. (June 5, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/litigation/committees/professional-liability/practice/2018/ethical-obligations-inelectronic-discovery/ [https://perma.cc/F9NM-3M4S]; Garaffa, supra note 77.
80 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
81 The duty to preserve evidence “requires counsel to investigate how a client’s
computers store digital information, to review with the client potentially discoverable
evidence . . . .” Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (D.N.J.
2004). In EPAC Technologies, Inc. v. HarperCollins Christian Publishing, Inc., the court
reprimanded the defendant for “fail[ure] to take . . . preservation obligations seriously”
when it allowed evidence to be lost that should’ve been preserved. EPAC Techs., Inc. v.
HarperCollins Christian Publ’g, Inc., No. 12-cv-00463, 2018 WL 1542040, at *18 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 29, 2018) (quoting Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2016 WL
54684, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2016)). According to the court, counsel should “be expected
to know that putting a legal hold in place requires [] notifying the IT department,” yet
“there was no timely notice give to the IT department.” Id. at *7, *18. In another case, the
attorney did not bother to ask the IT consultant about electronic documents and “was not
involved in identifying records custodians, [and he] did nothing to familiarize himself with
Play Visions’ document retention and destruction policies.” Play Visions, Inc. v. Dollar Tree
Stores, Inc., No. C90-1769, 2011 WL 2292326, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 8, 2011).
82 David H. Tennant & Michael G. McCartney, Forensic Examination of Digital Devices
in Civil Litigation: The Legal, Ethical and Technical Traps, 24 PRO. LAW. 1, 8 (2016)
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custody or control over ESI, and, considering the growing use of social
media, competency includes familiarity with social media terminology.83 At the end of the day, a “lawyer who [has agreed] to be retained
to provide legal advice or perform other legal services has implied that
he or she will use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the
performance of the tasks which they undertake.”84 Today, that
required skill and diligence means that a lawyer must be competent in
technology in order to properly advise a client on e-discovery issues.
RPC 3.3, too, which requires attorneys to act with candor in court,
imposes an obligation on attorneys to “avoid conduct that undermines
the integrity of the adjudicative process” and refrain from “allow[ing]
the [case] to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence
that the lawyer knows to be false.”85 This Rule, along with Rules 3.4
and 1.1, imposes a specific ethical obligation on attorneys to act
properly in all aspects of litigation, including the discovery process.
The RPC’s effects are limited, however, because it doesn’t give
judges any authority to sanction or discipline an attorney who fails to
follow them. There is no built-in enforcement mechanism, and any
violation must be reported through the proper channels (usually, the
local disciplinary body) and then must be proven in any disciplinary
proceeding that follows.86 The authority to impose any disciplinary
action or sanction must come from some other source.87
2. There is a common law duty to preserve discoverable documents.
Beyond the professional rules of conduct, attorneys have a
common-law duty to preserve discoverable documents. This obligation
begins not with the commencement of the lawsuit, but when litigation
is “probable” or reasonably anticipated.88 Reasonable anticipation is
an “objective standard, asking not whether the party in fact reasonably
foresaw litigation, but whether a reasonable party in the same factual
circumstances would have reasonably foreseen litigation.”89 At the
most basic level, this duty requires an attorney to work with the client

83 Zemil, supra note 36.
84 Garaffa, supra note 77.
85 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); Social Media
Ethical Obligations for Lawyers, EPIQ GLOBAL 1, 4 [hereinafter EPIQ].
86 Schaefer, supra note 20, at 18.
87 See infra Part III.
88 Grimm, supra note 62, at 1–2 (quoting A.B.A., CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS,
standard 10, at 20 (2004)).
89 O’Brien, supra note 9, at 165 n.91 (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 645
F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
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to identify the location and method of retrieving all relevant90
documents in the client’s control.91 It also requires an ability to
preserve all such documents throughout the life of the lawsuit.92 The
client is the one who possesses all the relevant discovery, but the
obligation to preserve that information falls squarely and primarily on
the advising attorney. “[T]he obligation to protect evidence runs first
to counsel, who then has a duty to advise and explain to the client its
obligations to retain pertinent documents that may be relevant to the
litigation.”93 A failure to adequately explain the duty to preserve
relevant documents often leads to sanctions. For example, an attorney
who “failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, failed to
keep the client reasonably informed about the status of his legal
matter, [and] intentionally failed to comply with proper discovery
requests” was suspended indefinitely.94 Another court imposed sanctions against a client who deleted some relevant evidence because he
was unsure what his attorney meant when the attorney ordered him to
retain “all relevant business records.”95 The client then “incorrectly
determined that the evidence was irrelevant.”96 Courts also impose
90 Although relevance is not an important consideration for this Note, it’s worthwhile
to mention that the duty to preserve evidence does not apply to all documents, but just to
relevant documents. “[T]he ‘duty to preserve potentially discoverable information does not
require a party to keep every scrap of paper’ in its file.” Grimm, supra note 62, at 4 (quoting
In re Kmart Corp., 371 B.R. 823, 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007)). Relevance is measured by
whether a document is potentially helpful to the opposing party and ultimately rests on a
choice based on “sound judgment and common sense.” Grimm, supra note 62, at 5; see also
Browning, supra note 54, at 290. The line of relevance is, admittedly, fuzzy, so attorneys like
to err on the side of caution and preserve more evidence than is necessary. Further,
attorneys should take the lead on determining what documents are relevant, since they will
likely be more familiar with the opposing party’s claims and defenses. Grimm, supra note
62, at 5; Schaefer, supra note 44, at 617–18.
91 In addition to the relevance limitation, parties are only permitted to discover
documents that are within their control or possession, which means that the party has the
legal authority or general ability to access the evidence. Margaret (Molly) DiBianca,
Discovery and Preservation of Social Media Evidence, A.B.A. BUS. L. TODAY (Jan. 23, 2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/01/02
_dibianca/ [https://perma.cc/TPL6-2H36].
92 Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, supra note 18, at 174. Failure to preserve evidence
may lead to sanctions. See Willoughby et al., supra note 64, at 803.
93 Garaffa, supra note 77. See also Mule v. 3-D Bldg. & Constr. Mgmt. Corp., No. CV
18-1997, 2021 WL 2788432, at *3–4, *14 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2021) (discussing the duty of
counsel to advise the client of information that must be preserved after the defendant
discarded several physical and electronic files that made up the “majority of [the
company’s] business records”).
94 Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Moody, 113 N.E.3d 520, 522, 527 (Ohio 2018).
95 Best Payphones, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 1-CV-3924, 2016 WL 792396, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2016).
96 Id. The court added that the “attorneys . . . should have advised [the client] not to
destroy any records relating to his business, even if they were ‘voluminous.’” Id.
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sanctions for clients and lawyers who respond to discovery requests
with unresponsive or irrelevant documents. In Steward v. Steward, the
court suspended the attorneys because their “discovery responses were
grossly insufficient.”97 Even an attorney whose negligence causes delay
in discovery can result in sanctions.98 In one case, a partner and
associate were suspended from practice for one year for failure to
promptly produce relevant documents.99
When this common-law duty is applied to e-discovery, courts have
been clear on what is required for parties when preserving evidence.
The Zubulake court set forth minimum ESI expectations for attorneys
who reasonably anticipate litigation. First, attorneys must issue a
“litigation hold” suspending the client’s routine document retention
and deletion policies to “ensure the preservation of relevant
documents.”100 After issuing the litigation hold,
[c]ounsel must oversee compliance with the litigation hold,
monitoring the party’s efforts to retain and produce the relevant
documents. . . . [I]t is not sufficient to notify all employees of a
litigation hold and expect that the party will then retain and
produce all relevant information. Counsel must take affirmative
steps to monitor compliance so that all sources of discoverable
information are identified and searched. 101

Courts are quite serious about the requirement to impose a litigation
hold with specific enough information to direct the client and do not
hesitate to impose sanctions for failure to implement a proper
document retention policy.102 In DR Distributors, LLC v. 21 Century
Smoking, Inc., the court imposed sanctions on both client and counsel
for failure to issue a litigation hold, which resulted in the deletion of
several online messages and emails.103 And in Nacco Materials Handling
Group, Inc. v. The Lilly Company, the court imposed sanctions on a client
whose counsel issued a proper litigation hold letter but failed to

97 Steward v. Steward, 529 B.R. 903, 909 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2015).
98 Neumeier & Hansen, supra note 43, at 2.
99 See In re Filosa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 460, 468, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Gilly, 976 F.
Supp. 2d 471, 478–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). It wasn’t just because of their discovery misconduct
that these attorneys were sanctioned. They were also guilty of suppressing evidence,
dishonest and fraudulent behavior, false testimony, and “intentionally deceptive
misconduct that interfered with the administration of justice.” Filosa, 976 F. Supp. 2d at
465–69; Gilly, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 478–80.
100 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); Garaffa, supra note
77; Grimm, supra note 62, at 4.
101 Zubulake, 229 F.R.D. at 432.
102 Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 32.
103 DR Distribs., LLC v. 21 Century Smoking, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 3d 839, 861, 863, 876,
884, 976–77 (N.D. Ill. 2021).
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monitor the preservation of evidence, which led to a loss of relevant
evidence.104 A similar situation happened in EPAC Technologies, Inc. v.
HarperCollins Christian Publishing, Inc., where the defendant made
“halfhearted attempts . . . to impose a litigation hold that was not
implemented with sufficient guidance or monitor[ing] by counsel.”105
According to the court, “[i]t is hard to imagine a circumstance in
which [counsel’s] steps to preserve ESI would have been considered
reasonable.”106
Second, attorneys must communicate directly and clearly with the
“key players” in the case who are likely to have relevant information
and “to understand how they stored information.”107 Third, attorneys
must instruct the client to produce copies of all relevant files and
ensure that those files are backed up and stored safely.108 “This
rigorous standard for ESI preservation makes sense given that
electronic files, unlike physical evidence, can be permanently
destroyed.”109 Yet many organizations are still quite unprepared to
meet these baseline expectations.110
The ethical and common-law duties to preserve evidence apply
equally to ESI from social media.111 Since more and more relevant
104 Nacco Materials Handling Grp., Inc. v. Lilly Co., 278 F.R.D. 395, 398, 404 (W.D.
Tenn. 2011).
105 EPAC Techs., Inc. v. HarperCollins Christian Publ’g, Inc., No. 12-cv-00463, 2018
WL 1542040, at *18 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2018).
106 Id. at *22.
107 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also
Garaffa, supra note 77; Grimm, supra note 62, at 4. One court imposed sanctions on a
litigant whose attorney failed to collect cell phone data from key players in the litigation.
In re Skanska USA Civ. Se. Inc., No. 20-CV-05980, 2021 WL 5226547, at *3, *10 (N.D. Fla.
Aug. 23, 2021).
108 Zubulake, 229 F.R.D. at 434; Garaffa, supra note 77. See also Grimm, supra note 62,
at 4; Shaffer v. Gaither, No. 14-cv-00106, 2016 WL 6594126, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2016)
(The court sanctioned a client for failure to preserve text messages, even though there were
many different ways to back up those texts. “[P]laintiff and her counsel failed to take
reasonable steps to preserve those texts,” which could’ve included “printing out the texts,
making an electronic copy of [them,] cloning the phone, or even taking possession of the
phone and instructing the client to simply get another one.”).
109 O’Brien, supra note 9, at 165.
110 As of 2017, less than 60% of organizations felt prepared to produce emails older
than six months upon commencement of litigation, and a much lower percent of
organizations felt prepared to produce other types of e-discovery (only 39% were prepared
to produce electronic files, 20% were prepared to produce information on mobile devices,
and 7% were prepared to produce contents on home computers, for example).
BARRACUDA, KEY ISSUES FOR E-DISCOVERY AND LEGAL COMPLIANCE: AN OSTERMAN
RESEARCH WHITE PAPER 4 fig.3 (2017). Even though this study notes that organizations are
the ones that themselves feel unprepared, this lack of preparation reflects poorly on
attorneys who have an obligation to ensure proper preparation for ESI preservation.
111 Van Namen, supra note 31, at 576. See also Browning, supra note 54, at 274 (“With
the inexorable spread of social media, and as these sites have become fertile ground for
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evidence is now found on social media,112 and considering the ease
with which ESI can be deleted or altered, lawyers have an obligation to
make sure clients preserve their social media posts—and that advice
should be given as soon as possible.113 “Lawyers uncomfortable with
technology cannot afford to take a ‘head in the sand’ approach when
it comes to their clients’ activities on . . . social media sites.”114 They
should regularly monitor the client’s social media activities, with the
understanding that people are getting increasingly “savvy” and more
relaxed on social media, not thinking as much about the information
they’re putting online and the potential consequences of it.115 And
since social media evidence can be important in litigation,116 lawyers
must take appropriate measures to preserve that social media content
as soon as they learn of it.117 Furthermore, lawyers have a duty to
inform their clients about the potential consequences of deleting or
altering social media posts and how to preserve that social media
evidence.118 Just as lawyers are prohibited from advising a client to
burn a diary or a letter, lawyers are also prohibited from advising a
client to delete relevant social media content.119 In one egregious case,
an attorney advised his client “to ‘clean up’ his Facebook page” by
deleting specific photos that would be embarrassing if published at

both formal and informal discovery, it is more vital than ever for attorneys, on both sides of
the docket and every practice area, to be aware of their clients’—and their own—obligations
regarding the preservation of such evidence and the consequences of spoliating this
evidence.”).
112 See supra Part I.
113 Frazer, supra note 26, at 552, 556; Tennant & McCartney, supra note 82.
114 Browning, supra note 39, at 1; see also Tennant & McCartney, supra note 82, at 9
(“[E]very litigator must be sufficiently equipped to know what information is contained on,
or accessed through, mobile devices, and be able to evaluate whether those digital files may
have evidentiary value.”).
115 Pro. Liab. Prac. Grp., Social Media and Spoliation—Can a Client Delete Her Facebook
Posts?, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/social-mediaand-spoliation-can-client-delete-her-facebook-posts [https://perma.cc/ZS85-2N4S]; see also
Browning, supra note 54, at 289; Browning, supra note 39, at 3.
116 See supra Part I.
117 Browning, supra note 54, at 293.
118 John Browning, Can You Advise Clients to “Clean Up” Their Social Media Pages?, FAM.
LAW. MAG. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://familylawyermagazine.com/articles/advise-clientclean-up-social-media-pages/ [https://perma.cc/WGG4-HURQ]; Frazer, supra note 26, at
552; Brocker L. Firm, To Delete or Not to Delete: Social Media and the Lawyer’s Role, CAMPBELL
L. OBSERVER (Oct. 1, 2014), http://campbelllawobserver.com/to-delete-or-not-to-deletesocial-media-and-the-lawyers-role/ [https://perma.cc/BSJ3-3JKL].
119 Frazer, supra note 26, at 552; Brocker L. Firm, supra note 118; see also Chapman v.
Hiland Operating, LLC, No. 1:13-cv-052, 2014 WL 2434775, at *1–2 (D.N.D. May 29, 2014)
(sanctioning a plaintiff who deactivated her Facebook account at the request of her
attorney).
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trial.120 The court responded by imposing monetary sanctions and
referring the attorney to the state disciplinary board.121 Lawyers are
also prohibited from advising clients to “friend request” the opposing
party, a juror, or a witness.122 Lawyers, may, however, advise clients to
change their privacy settings or tell clients to use discretion when
posting on social media.123 Ultimately, “it is ethically permissible to
advise . . . client[s] on the management of social media” as long as
attorneys do not advise clients to “destroy evidence, introduce
misleading evidence, or withhold evidence from discovery.”124
III.

CURRENT SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS

There are several sources of authority that courts cite when
deciding whether to impose sanctions or discipline on attorneys who
abuse the discovery process. First, most federal courts adopt the local
disciplinary rules of the state they’re sitting in, which usually require
them to report all disciplinary issues to the local disciplinary body.
Second, courts can (but rarely do) use their statutory authority to
impose sanctions. Third, although it’s no longer a popular source of
authority, courts in the past have invoked their inherent authority as a
power to impose sanctions. Finally, the FRCP gives federal courts
authority to impose sanctions on clients and attorneys for various
misdeeds, and courts have used this authority to impose sanctions on
attorneys for e-discovery misconduct.
A. Federal Courts Adopt Local Disciplinary Rules
Most federal courts have adopted the disciplinary rules of the state
courts in which they reside.125 These rules establish disciplinary
proceedings for attorneys.126 These rules explain, among other things,
to whom a report of professional misconduct should be made,127 the
120 Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester, 736 S.E.2d 699, 702 (Va. 2013).
121 Id. at 703. The attorney was eventually suspended for five years. See Agreed
Disposition Memorandum Order, In the Matter of Matthew B. Murray, VBS Dockets Nos.
11-070-088405 and 11-070-088422 (2013).
122 EPIQ, supra note 85, at 4.
123 Pro. Liab. Prac. Grp., supra note 115; Browning, supra note 118.
124 Richard S. Kling, Khalid Hasan & Martin D. Gould, Ethics and Social Media, 105 ILL.
BAR J. 30, 30 (2017) (quoting John Levin, Social Media—Advising Your Client, JOHN LEVIN
(Jan. 2015), https://www.johnlevin.info/legalethics/article/social-media-advising-yourclient [https://perma.cc/9TBB-5YW3]).
125 As of 2017, only a handful of federal district courts did not have an internal
disciplinary system. See Schaefer, supra note 20, at 18–19 & n.118.
126 Id. at 18; Willoughby et al., supra note 64, at 817.
127 See Schaefer, supra note 20, at 22–24 (discussing the duty to report attorney
misconduct).
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process for investigating the misconduct, and the procedures for a fair
hearing on the report.128 Each state’s supreme court also “authorizes
a body to investigate complaints against attorneys, determine if
disciplinary charges are warranted, and if so, file and prosecute
disciplinary charges.”129
There are many problems with these local rules and their
disciplinary process, however. The first issue is that these state disciplinary systems depend completely on judges and other lawyers to report
attorney misconduct. But reports of e-discovery misconduct and
subsequent disciplinary procedures are “exceedingly rare” and are
often only included “in the context of multiple other rule violations,”
so situations of e-discovery misconduct are often not addressed.130
Then, once a court receives a report of misconduct, they must refer
the issue to the appropriate disciplinary body.131 An investigation and
a hearing necessarily follow, leading to a string of satellite litigation,
which takes time and money and is a strain on the legal system and its
resources.132 Second, many local disciplinary rules don’t even mention
sanctions for discovery abuse—much less e-discovery abuse; they just
give the court broad powers to impose sanctions for general misconduct.133 Additionally, the local rules among states are “inconsistent and
conflicting” and cause “problems of uncertainty,” especially for
attorneys who practice in multiple states.134 Each state has a different
multi-factor test that its courts must apply when deciding whether to
impose sanctions. Common factors include history of bad behavior,
whether prejudice was caused, a comparison to similar past cases, past
relationship between the client and attorney, extent of personal
128 Id. at 18 n.117; Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative
Analysis of Process and Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL PRO. 209, 332 (2011). For examples of detailed
federal district court attorney discipline procedures, see S.D.N.Y. LOC. R. 1.5 (2018); C.D.
CAL. LOC. R. 83–3 (2021); N.D. ILL. LOC. R. 83.25–83.30 (2021).
129 Schaefer, supra note 20, at 19.
130 Id. at 20–21; see id. at 22–24 (speculating why discovery misconduct goes
underreported).
131 Id. at 30–31.
132 Id. at 31 n.205. Disciplinary proceedings can happen anywhere from several
months to several years after the misconduct occurred. See In re Gilly, 976 F. Supp. 2d 471,
471–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) and In re Filosa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 460, 460, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(disciplinary proceedings were finalized four years after the original misconduct); Allied
Concrete Co. v. Lester, 736 S.E.2d 699, 699 (Va. 2013) and Agreed Disposition
Memorandum Order, In the Matter of Matthew B. Murray, VBS Dockets Nos. 11-070-088405
and 11-070-088422 (2013) (proceedings happened seven months after the misconduct
occurred); In re Gluck, 114 F. Supp. 3d 57, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (proceedings happened two
years after the misconduct occurred).
133 See supra note 128 (providing examples of some of the largest district courts’ local
rules, which are silent on discovery sanctions).
134 Curtis, supra note 128, at 211.
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responsibility, whether sanctions would be effective, and whether the
misconduct could be justified in any way.135 The lack of any document
retention policy is also a factor courts might consider.136 Serious
sanctions have only ever been threatened for those who engage in
extreme discovery abuse (taking intentional, affirmative steps to
participate in misconduct that results in substantial prejudice).137
These different factors and different tests have led to vastly different
results in different courts for similar misconduct. For example, a
lawyer who consistently failed to appear for scheduling order and
pretrial conferences (citing various excuses) was suspended for sixty
days and ordered to attend six hours of continuing legal education,138
but a lawyer who failed to implement a litigation hold for one year did
not receive any sanctions whatsoever.139 Another attorney who similarly “failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness [and]
failed to keep the client reasonably informed about the status” of his
case received the serious sanction of indefinite suspension from
practicing law.140 Another attorney was slapped with a one-year
suspension and a referral to the lower court for more investigation for
behaving unprofessionally and submitting “grossly insufficient”
discovery responses.141 In cases where an attorney advised the client to
deactivate their Facebook account or delete some photos, sanctions
ranged from an order to make a good faith effort to reactivate the
account to a five-year suspension and monetary sanctions.142 Attorney
sanctions for e-discovery abuses vary widely across federal districts,
likely because of the lack of a uniform system to guide courts.

135 Grimm, supra note 62, at 6, 9–10; Eleanor Brock, Discovery Obstruction as Attorney
Misconduct: Lawyer Suspended in Egregious Case, LOGIKCULL (Oct. 25, 2018), https://
www.logikcull.com/blog/discovery-obstruction-as-attorney-misconduct-attorneysuspended-in-egregious-case [https://perma.cc/46TY-PAS9].
136 Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, supra note 18, at 176.
137 Id. at 180; Neumeier & Hansen, supra note 43, at 4; Tennant & McCartney, supra
note 82, at 9.
138 In re Marshall, No. 15-MC-88, 2016 WL 81484, at *2, *4, *7, *8, *12 (M.D. La. Jan.
7, 2016).
139 VOOM HD Holdings LLC v. EchoStar Satellite L.L.C., 939 N.Y.S.2d 321, 326, 327
(N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
140 Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Moody, 113 N.E.3d 520, 525, 527 (Ohio 2018).
141 Steward v. Steward, 529 B.R. 903, 907, 909, 913–14, 919 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2015).
142 See Chapman v. Hiland Operating, LLC, No. 13-cv-052, 2014 WL 2434775, at *1–2
(D.N.D. May 29, 2014); Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester, 736 S.E.2d 699, 702, 703 (Va. 2013);
Agreed Disposition Memorandum Order, In the Matter of Matthew B. Murray, VBS Dockets
Nos. 11-070-088405 and 11-070-088422 (2013).
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B. Federal Courts Have Statutory Authority to Impose Sanctions
In addition to local rules, Congress has given federal courts
statutory authority143 to impose sanctions on attorneys who “multipl[y]
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.”144 The
court may require such an attorney to pay for any extra costs incurred
as a result.145 This authority, however, is very narrow and only applies
to e-discovery abuse if that abuse led to an unnecessary extension of
the discovery process. It’s also not an authority that courts often
invoke, because it would require some creative interpretation for a
court to apply this federal statute to an e-discovery case.146
C. Courts Have Relied on Their Inherent Authority
Third, courts in the past have relied on their inherent authority
to sanction attorneys for e-discovery misconduct.147 This authority,
used most frequently when courts want to impose sanctions against
parties and attorneys, comes from the court’s authority “to manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.”148 This inherent power has been invoked in cases
of bad faith and when no other local rule provides authority to impose
sanctions (or prohibits using inherent power in this way).149 Courts
like to rely on their inherent power for sanctions because it removes
143 In addition to this civil authority to impose sanctions, destroying or altering
evidence is also a federal crime. Anyone who “corruptly” or “knowingly” “alters, destroys,
mutilates, conceals, covers up, [or] falsifies” any document or record in discovery “with the
intent to “impair,” “impede, obstruct, or influence” the discovery process can be punished
with fines or imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2018); § 1519. Since this Note focuses
only on sanctions in civil cases, no further attention will be paid to this criminal statute or
the punishments imposed under it.
144 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2018); Schaefer, supra note 20, at 16. Notably, this appears to be
one of the only sources of authority that allow discovery sanctions to be imposed only on
attorneys, rather than only the litigant. See Willoughby et al., supra note 64, at 799 n.42.
145 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2018).
146 In DR Distributors, plaintiffs argued that the court should invoke this statutory
authority in order to impose sanctions, but the court refused to make use of this authority.
DR Distribs., LLC v. 21 Century Smoking, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 3d 839, 951–52 (N.D. Ill. 2021).
147 See Neumeier & Hansen, supra note 43, at 3; Willoughby et al., supra note 64, at 799;
Schaefer, supra note 20, at 16; Grimm, supra note 62, at 12. See also Hodge v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 449 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The imposition of a sanction . . . for
spoliation of evidence is an inherent power of federal courts . . . .”). For more examples of
courts using their inherent authority to impose sanctions on attorneys, see Bruner v. City of
Phoenix, No. CV-18-00664, 2020 WL 554387, at *6 (D. Ariz. Feb. 4, 2020); Brown v. SSA
Atlantic, LLC, No. CV419-303, 2021 WL 1015891, at *2–4 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 16, 2021); Steward
v. Steward, 529 B.R. 903, 913–14 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2015).
148 Willoughby et al., supra note 64, at 799–800 (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)).
149 Schaefer, supra note 44, at 16, 31.
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the need to refer the misconduct to the state’s disciplinary process,
which would require satellite litigation.150 This is a huge benefit, but
the problem with courts using their inherent authority to impose
sanctions is that the FRCP expressly prohibits it. According to the 2015
Amendment, Rule 37(e) “forecloses reliance on inherent authority or
state law to determine when certain measures should be used.”151 Of
course, as discussed below, Rule 37(e) only imposes sanctions against
disobedient litigants, but it would be inconsistent for the FRCP to
prohibit reliance on the court’s inherent authority for party sanctions
but permit reliance for attorney sanctions. Therefore, the recent trend
is for courts to no longer turn to their inherent authority when they
want to impose sanctions on attorneys.
D. Courts Have Relied on Other Sanction Rules in the FRCP
Instead, courts turn to the FRCP, which addresses e-discovery in
several Rules. Rule 34 discusses document production in discovery,
and the 2006 amendment clarified that a Rule 34 request for
documents is “expansive” and “should be understood to encompass,
and . . . should include [ESI].”152 The Rule broadly includes ESI
“stored in any medium,” which is intentionally flexible to allow for
future advances in technology.153 Rule 37 is Rule 34’s sibling rule154
and identifies sanctions for parties who fail to comply with discovery
requests.155 Rule 37(a)(5) requires courts, upon granting a motion to
compel discovery, to order the disobedient party (or that party’s
advising attorney) to pay reasonable expenses, including attorneys’

150 Id. at 30–31; see also Curtis, supra note 128, at 212; supra note 128 (listing examples
of local district disciplinary rules that specify details for hearing processes).
151 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. See also
NuVasive, Inc. v. Kormanis, No. 18CV282, 2019 WL 1171486, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 13, 2019)
(stating that the court no longer has the ability to use its inherent authority when imposing
sanctions).
152 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
153 FED. R. CIV. P. 34; FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
154 Note that Rule 26(g)(3) also allows courts to impose sanctions for improperly
certifying a document submitted to the court, Rule 11(c) permits sanctions for
misrepresenting information to the court, and Rule 16(f) permits sanctions for failure to
obey pretrial orders or other case management requirements. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3);
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f). However, this Note will only focus on the FRCP
sanctions in Rule 37, which specifically apply to discovery abuse.
155 Neumeier & Hansen, supra note 43, at 2. Rule 37 provides specific sanctions for
specific discovery failures, but courts often take advantage of this power by using their broad
discretion to impose other sanctions not explicitly mentioned in the FRCP, including
adverse jury instructions, exclusion of evidence, or even a dismissal or default judgment.
Id.

2248

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:5

fees, incurred in making that motion to compel.156 If a party fails to
obey a court order compelling discovery, Rule 37(b)(2)(C) requires
courts to order the disobedient party, the advising attorney, or both to
pay reasonable expenses caused by the failure to obey.157 Rules
37(d)(3) and 37(f) require similar sanctions for a party who fails to
respond to depositions or answer interrogatories, or who refuses to
participate in good faith in developing a discovery plan.158 Rule 37(e),
however, is the most important Rule, because it specifically addresses
sanctions for e-discovery abuse, and it is also the authority that courts
most often invoke when imposing sanctions.159 It reads:
(e) Failure to Preserve Electronically Stored Information. If
electronically stored information that should have been
preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost
because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it,
and it cannot be restored or replaced through additional
discovery, the court:
(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the
information, may order measures no greater than
necessary to cure the prejudice; or
(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to
deprive another party of the information’s use in the
litigation may:
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable
to the party;
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the
information was unfavorable to the party; or
(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment. 160

The 2015 amendment to Rule 37(e) clarifies that this Rule only
applies when the “lost information should have been preserved in the
anticipation . . . of litigation and the party failed to take reasonable
steps to preserve it,”161 but it doesn’t apply to electronic information
156 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5).
157 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
158 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3), 37(f).
159 See, e.g., DR Distribs., LLC v. 21 Century Smoking, Inc. 513 F. Supp. 3d 839, 956
(N.D. Ill. 2021); In re Skanska USA Civ. Se. Inc., No. 20-CV-05980, 2021 WL 5226547, at *8
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2021); Mule v. 3-D Bldg. & Constr. Mgmt. Corp., No. CV 18-1997, 2021
WL 2788432, at *7–17 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2021); EPAC Techs., Inc. v. HarperCollins Christian
Publ’g, Inc., No. 12-cv-00463, 2018 WL 1542040, at *10–28 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2018);
NuVasive, Inc. v. Kormanis, No. 18CV282, 2019 WL 1171486, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 13,
2019); Black v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 542 F. Supp. 3d 750, 752–54 (M.D. Tenn. 2021).
160 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
161 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. See supra Part
II (discussing the duty to preserve evidence).
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that was destroyed but still can be found in a different location.162
Subdivision (e)(2) specifically “authorizes courts to use specified and
very severe measures to address . . . failures to preserve [ESI], but only
on finding that the party . . . acted with the intent to deprive another
party of the information[].”163
Notice several differences between the sanctions defined in Rule
37(e) and the sanctions in other sections of Rule 37. First, Rule 37(e)
provides much more detailed information about what factors courts
should consider when dealing with e-discovery spoliation. The Rule
lays out a variety of sanctions that a court could impose, whereas the
other subdivisions of Rule 37 only permit a court to order the payment
of legal expenses and attorneys’ fees. The detailed information of Rule
37(e), including the several pages of Advisory Committee Notes that
follow, indicate that the drafters of the FRCP wanted to emphasize the
importance of proper e-discovery conduct and warn parties, attorneys,
and courts alike that e-discovery procedures were to be taken seriously.
Second, notice that the other subdivisions of Rule 37 require
mandatory sanctions for the specified misconduct, but 37(e) uses the
word “may,” presumably granting the court more discretion in
deciding whether to impose sanctions and what types of sanctions to
impose. This is likely a sign that the drafters of the FRCP were trying
to maintain flexibility in the ever-changing age of technology.
Finally, and mostly importantly, Rule 37(e) does not mention
sanctions for attorneys; it only authorizes sanctions for the offending
party. The other subdivisions of Rule 37 allow sanctions to be imposed
on attorneys, the client, or both for specified misconduct, but 37(e)
only imposes sanctions on clients. This seems to be an intentional
omission. The directly adjacent subdivisions of Rule 37(e) include
sanctions for attorneys, but this one subdivision doesn’t mention it at
all. Further, there isn’t any explanation by the FRCP Advisory
Committee for this omission, and it doesn’t appear that any scholars
have attempted to speculate as to why attorney sanctions are omitted
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
163 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. The court’s
authority to impose such serious sanctions was slightly offset by what was previously Rule
37(f). The Rule prevented sanctions from being imposed “for loss of [ESI] resulting from
the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f)
advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment; FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s
note to 2015 amendment; see also Vargas, supra note 19, at 413. That “safe harbor”
provision, as it was called, wasn’t very effective, though, because it had a limited scope and
therefore provided minimal protection for e-discovery losses. Willoughby et al., supra note
64, at 824. The Advisory Committee removed the Rule in the 2015 amendment, citing a
failure to “adequately address[] the serious problems resulting from the continued
exponential growth in the volume of such information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory
committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
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in Rule 37(e). This omission likely explains why many courts only
discuss client misconduct in cases of discovery abuse and suggest that
the client is the one fully to blame for the spoliation. Courts often
ignore the fact that the “primary cause of . . . spoliation . . . is the
lawyer,” who is in a much better position to understand the claims and
defenses and know what steps to take to preserve pertinent
information.164 Yet lawyers rarely face liability for failing to preserve
evidence, and the client is often penalized instead.165 For example, in
Christou v. Beatport, the defendant failed to take any action to preserve
relevant text messages and later lost his mobile device.166 The court
mentioned counsel’s incompetence by stating that “[a] commercial
party represented by experienced and highly sophisticated counsel
cannot disregard the duty to preserve potentially relevant documents
when a case like this is filed,” yet only imposed sanctions on the
client.167 The lead attorneys were never disciplined.168 In re Skanska
164 Schaefer, supra note 44, at 620. See also NuVasive, Inc. v. Kormanis, No. 18CV282,
2019 WL 1171486, at *8, *16 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 13, 2019) (court focused on client’s duty to
preserve evidence and that the client “should have obtained appropriate advice” but
completely ignored any discussion of the attorney’s duty to proactively advise the client).
Some courts do, though, raise eyebrows at egregious cases of intentional spoliation and
wonder if the attorney may be at fault too. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Ct. of L.A.
Cnty., 954 P.2d 511, 518 (Cal. 1998) (“The purposeful destruction of evidence by a client
while represented by a lawyer may raise suspicions that the lawyer participated as well. Even
if these suspicions are incorrect, a prudent lawyer will wish to avoid them and the burden
of disciplinary proceedings to which they may give rise and will take affirmative steps to
preserve and safeguard relevant evidence.”); Browning, supra note 39, at 12 (when
discussing the facts of Crowe v. Marquette Transportation, said, “While the record is silent as
to any role played by [the plaintiff’s] counsel, one would hope that the deactivation was
instigated solely by the client himself. Even so, the case serves as a cautionary tale for lawyers
who should visit with their clients and verify that independent ‘clean-up’ actions or account
deactivation have not occurred.”).
165 Schaefer, supra note 44, at 628. See Best Payphones, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 1CV-3924, 2016 WL 792396, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2016) (court blamed the attorney for
failure to properly advise the client on what business records to keep, but only sanctioned
the client); Mule v. 3-D Bldg. & Constr. Mgmt. Corp., No. CV 18-1997, 2021 WL 2788432,
at *14, *17 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2021) (court mentioned the attorney’s duty to inform the client
about what information must be preserved and even imposed a monetary sanction on the
attorney at the hearing to compel evidence, yet at the conclusion of the case only imposed
sanctions only on the client and not on the attorney); Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339–40 (D.N.J. 2004) (the duty to preserve evidence
“requires counsel to investigate . . . digital information, [and] to review with the client
potentially discoverable evidence,” yet the court only sanctioned the client and not the
attorney).
166 Christou v. Beatport, LLC, No. 10-cv-02912, 2013 WL 248058, at *13 (D. Colo. Jan.
23, 2013).
167 Id. at *14.
168 The case mentions no sanctions or discipline for the attorneys. Id. Further, a
search in the Colorado public discipline database indicated that the lead attorneys were
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also discusses counsel’s involvement in implementing a litigation hold
and pointing out key players, yet the court ultimately only sanctions
the client for its failure to suspend normal document retention
practices that led to the destruction of cell phone data.169 The 1100
West court similarly imposed monetary sanctions on a party whose
counsel failed to produce tens of thousands of responsive documents,
but the attorneys themselves did not face any professional discipline.170
In Shaffer v. Gaither, the court reprimanded both the plaintiff and her
counsel for their “fail[ure] to take reasonable steps to preserve . . .
texts,” but the court didn’t entertain any potential sanctions for the
counsel’s actions.171 Further, there are very few instances where courts
will sanction attorneys without also sanctioning clients.172 And courts
that do impose sanctions on attorneys usually only impose sanctions
due to “a pattern of misconduct, not an isolated incident.”173
IV.

A NEW RULE ADDRESSING ATTORNEY SANCTIONS SHOULD BE
ADDED TO THE FRCP

Given the ubiquity of electronic evidence, the many opportunities
for e-discovery abuse, and the primary role of the lawyer in preserving
that evidence, the lack of any uniform system to address attorney ediscovery misconduct is concerning.174 Federal precedent indicates
that there are so many ways for attorneys to abuse the discovery
process, yet the current sources of authority for imposing sanctions
don’t appropriately address the problem. Each court has a different
disciplinary procedure, most of which require another attorney or
judge to first report misconduct, and then a hearing must follow,
which is inefficient because it utilizes valuable court resources. The
never disciplined. See Attorney Search and Disciplinary History, COLO. SUP. CT. https://
coloradosupremecourt.com/Search/AttSearch.asp [https://perma.cc/6EV6-8UXH].
169 In re Skanska USA Civ. Se. Inc., No. 20-CV-05980, 2021 WL 5226547, at *1, *3–4
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2021).
170 1100 West, LLC v. Red Spot Paint & Varnish Co., No. 05-cv-1670, 2009 WL 1605118,
at *9, *11, *35 (S.D. Ind. June 5, 2009). See also Schaefer, supra note 20, at 6.
171 Shaffer v. Gaither, No. 14-cv-00106, 2016 WL 6594126, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 1,
2016).
172 Schaefer, supra note 44, at 628; Willoughby et al., supra note 64, at 818.
173 Willoughby et al., supra note 64, at 818. See In re Gilly, 976 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478–79
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) and In re Filosa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 460, 465–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (an associate
and partner were disciplined for their discovery misconduct, but also because they made
fraudulent misrepresentations to the court, engaged in intentionally deceptive misconduct,
and failed to correct false testimony).
174 Additionally, private lawsuits cannot solve the issue because attorneys generally
cannot sue opposing counsel for discovery abuse, and clients rarely sue their own attorneys
for malpractice based on e-discovery abuse. See Schaefer, supra note 20, at 27; Schaefer,
supra note 44, at 628.
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various state systems in place also lead to great inconsistencies across
similar cases.175 The FRCP does address sanctions for discovery in
many Rules, but doesn’t authorize courts to impose sanctions on
attorneys under the specific ESI Rule. The same Rule also prevents
courts from using their inherent authority to impose sanctions. The
lack of a uniform system then leads to a lack of reporting and a lack of
uniformity in the imposition of sanctions. Many lawyers get away with
their misconduct as a result. It’s also likely that courts aren’t sanctioning attorneys because there is no framework with which to guide their
sanctions and to remind them about attorneys’ obligations in ediscovery. “Courts . . . are reluctant to sanction counsel . . . [b]ut
when they abuse the system . . . it is unfair to complying parties not to
sanction the violators.”176 Something must address this problem.
A new Rule should be adopted to give notice to all interested
parties of an attorney’s duties in e-discovery. A new Rule defining a
framework for attorney sanctions would also provide predictability,
uniformity, and efficiency. Predictability is needed so that courts,
parties, and attorneys alike know what obligations they have in ediscovery and what sanctions to expect for various abuses. Uniformity
will then serve the goal of predictability, because knowing that
sanctions are similar across all federal districts will allow attorneys to
know what sanctions might be imposed. Finally, efficiency is needed
to prevent satellite litigation and disciplinary proceedings after the
misconduct is reported that take up valuable court resources.
A. Proposing a New Rule to Add to the FRCP
Since the FRCP has successfully addressed the imposition of
sanctions for clients who abuse the discovery process, it only makes
sense for the FRCP to also address attorney sanctions for the same
misconduct.177 Because ESI is so important to discovery, and because
attorneys play such a major role in the discovery process, the FRCP
should add a Rule authorizing the court to impose sanctions on
attorneys who act improperly in e-discovery. Adding a new Rule to the
FRCP is the best solution because it allows for predictability, efficiency,
and uniformity in federal courts. The following proposed Rule
provides predictability because it specifies a test for federal courts to

175 See supra Part III (discussing state court disciplinary systems and their
shortcomings).
176 DR Distribs., LLC v. 21 Century Smoking, LLC, 513 F. Supp. 3d 839, 862 (N.D. Ill.
2021).
177 See supra Part III.
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use when deciding whether to impose sanctions.178 Although the test
is broad and leaves room for interpretation in its application, it is still
narrow enough for judges to know what to look for when imposing
sanctions, and it enables attorneys to know what process the judge will
go through when deciding whether to impose sanctions. This proposed Rule also provides uniformity, because all federal courts will now
be applying this same standard and analyzing the same factors, instead
of following whatever disciplinary procedures the state courts have
implemented. Finally, this proposed Rule provides for much more
efficiency in imposing sanctions because it permits the court in the
pending case to impose sanctions without referring the attorney to the
state disciplinary body for further proceedings on the violation.
What follows is the new proposed Rule: FRCP 37(g).
(g) Attorney’s Failure to Preserve Electronically Stored
Information. If electronically stored information that should
have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of
litigation is lost
(1) because an attorney failed to adequately advise the party
to take reasonable steps to preserve it, the court may,
after considering the prejudice to the moving party,
willful intent to deprive, any history of misconduct,
effectiveness of sanctions, and any other aggravating
factors:
(A) order the attorney to pay reasonable expenses,
including attorneys’ fees, no greater than necessary
to cure the prejudice against the other party;
(B) order the attorney to submit a new discovery plan to
the court;
(C) order the attorney to submit an affidavit to the court
describing the attorney’s discovery compliance
efforts; or
(D) impose any other sanction the court may deem
appropriate;
(2) because an attorney advised a client to alter or destroy
relevant evidence with the intent to deprive another
party of the information’s use in the litigation, the court
may:
(A) hold the attorney in contempt;

178 Ideally, this Rule would be even more specific, but it’s currently drafted with broad
language to maintain flexibility for applicability to various facts and circumstances in future
cases. It also uses broad language to remain consistent with Rule 37(e), which it is based
on.
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(B) refer the attorney to the proper state disciplinary
body with a recommendation for temporary
suspension;
(C) in the most egregious cases, refer the attorney to the
state disciplinary body with a recommendation for
disqualification and disbarment; or
(D) impose any other sanction the court may deem
appropriate.

There are several things to note about this proposed Rule. First,
the intent of this Rule is to be used in combination with 37(e), so that
when an attorney is at fault for e-discovery spoliation, the court is
authorized to impose sanctions on both the client and the attorney.
Second, the Rule addresses both intentional and negligent spoliation
and creates different factors to consider and different sanctions to
impose for each type of spoliation, depending on the severity of the
misconduct. Third, subsections 37(g)(2)(B) and (C) require federal
judges to recommend suspension and disbarment to the appropriate
disciplinary body, because disciplinary actions must still go through the
state system for recordation and other administrative matters. A
recommendation also allows the sanctioned attorney an opportunity
to appeal the decision before the disciplinary body, and allows that
disciplinary body to launch a new investigation if deemed necessary.
This seems to present the same issue of too much satellite litigation,
but this new Rule won’t require a report of misconduct or a separate
hearing on the misconduct. The court in the pending case will be able
to immediately review evidence of misconduct, conduct a hearing, and
make a recommendation to the appropriate disciplinary body. The
state disciplinary board will choose whether to impose the sanction but
can request a new hearing if appropriate.
Finally, this Rule will also make a statement about the principles
of the legal profession, emphasizing the fact that it actually does take
e-discovery misconduct seriously by imposing sanctions for those who
act wrongly and dishonestly.179 “The imposition of sanctions is a
serious matter and should be approached with circumspection. An
attorney’s name and reputation are his [or her] stock in trade and thus
any unfair or hasty sullying of that name strikes at the sanctioned
attorney’s livelihood.”180 Applying this Rule will allow courts to make
careful, reasoned sanctioning decisions, considering all relevant
factors—rather than unfair or hasty sanctions.

179 Schaefer, supra note 20, at 34.
180 DR Distribs., LLC v. 21 Century Smoking, LLC, 513 F. Supp. 3d 839, 862 (N.D. Ill.
2021) (quoting Hart v. Blanchette, No. 13-CV-6458, 2019 WL 1416632, at *28 (W.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2019)).
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This proposed Rule may, admittedly, violate the Rules Enabling
Act (REA), which authorizes the Supreme Court “to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure” so long as “[s]uch rules [do] not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”181 Although the
Court has never invalidated a Federal Rule because it violated the REA,
portions of proposed Rule 37(g) may be venturing into an
abridgement of substantive rights, if they impose any enforceable
obligations on attorneys beyond sanctions within a case.182 However,
any potential violation of the REA is easily avoided if Congress itself
enacts 37(g), rather than leaving it to the Supreme Court to adopt an
amendment to the FRCP.
B. Other Solutions Have Been Suggested, But They Are Inadequate
Another scholar, Paula Schaefer, has written several articles on
attorney misconduct in discovery, and she has suggested several
solutions to minimize such misconduct.183 Those solutions include (1)
discussing discovery expectations in the pretrial conference; (2)
mandating a discovery training for judges and their staff; (3) requiring
violating attorneys to attend a continuing legal education training on
discovery; (4) amending local disciplinary rules; or (5) mandating
disciplinary referrals.184 However, each of these suggestions fall short
of fully solving the problem.
1. Discovery expectations and potential sanctions should be
discussed in the pretrial conference.
The first suggestion involves attorneys discussing discovery
expectations and sanctions for violating those expectations in the
pretrial conference. FRCP 16 governs case management and suggests
that courts order attorneys to attend a pretrial conference to address
miscellaneous matters.185 Perhaps in these pretrial conferences, judges
should discuss general expectations and obligations of attorneys
throughout the discovery process and any sanctions that will be
imposed for violating those obligations.186 Any such discussions should

181 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2018).
182 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act, 66 UCLA
L. REV. 654, 657, 672–73 (2019). Since the Court has never invalidated a Rule on the basis
of the REA, the Court has never had the opportunity to address exactly what the Act
prohibits. Id. It is not desired that proposed Rule 37(g) give the Court such an opportunity.
183 See Schaefer, supra note 20; Schaefer, supra note 44; Paula Schaefer, “Trust Me”
Versus Transparency in Civil Document Discovery, 50 U. TOL. L. REV. 491 (2019).
184 Schaefer, supra note 20, at 34.
185 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a).
186 Schaefer, supra note 20, at 35–37.
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then be memorialized in the mandatory scheduling order that courts
must issue at the beginning of the case.187 Although this suggestion
addresses sanctions before discovery has commenced, which provides
predictability for all involved parties, it still leaves a huge gray area
because it’s a solution that lacks uniformity. Courts still have no
guidance on what sanctions should be imposed and for what types of
misconduct. It’s likely that each scheduling order discussing attorney
sanctions would define different sanctions for similar misconduct.
Further, it shouldn’t be left to judges to inform attorneys of ethical
obligations in discovery. At the very least, attorneys should already
know that they shouldn’t be abusing the e-discovery process, and
judges shouldn’t be expected to discuss such obvious baseline
expectations during case management.
2. Judges and their staff should take a continuing legal education
program on discipline.
Another suggestion requires judges, their clerks, and their
support staff to attend a continuing legal education program to learn
about discipline for discovery misconduct.188 A program like this
would “include the basics regarding applicable professional conduct
rules, reporting rules applicable to judges, and the court’s discipline
system.”189 However, this solution poses the same concern as the
previous suggested solution: judges and their staff should not be the
ones to turn to for e-discovery misconduct. The focus should be on
attorneys and their bad behavior. If anything, attorneys should be the
ones to take a continuing legal education program on discipline, not
judges and their staff. Further, this solution lacks predictability,
efficiency, and uniformity. It would still lead to satellite litigation, and
it still doesn’t provide any guidance to judges on what sanctions may
be imposed for different types of misconduct. Once guidance is
provided (such as, for example, by a new FRCP Rule), then perhaps an
educational program like this would be helpful. But until a uniform
system is adopted, mere education won’t adequately address the
problem.190

187 Id. at 37.
188 Id. at 38.
189 Id.
190 Beyond skirting the actual problem of lawyer misconduct, this suggested solution
could face constitutional barriers. In general, federal judges value their independence and
fear that additional requirements violate separation of powers. See James V. Grimaldi, Joe
Palazzolo & Coulter Jones, Judges Held Off Congress’s Efforts to Impose Ethics Rules—Until Now,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2021, 11:03 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-held-offcongresss-efforts-to-impose-ethics-rulesuntil-now-11640275421 [https://perma.cc/GVU9-
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3. Attorneys who violate e-discovery rules should attend a continuing
legal education program.
A third suggestion proposes that attorneys who violate discovery
rules should attend some sort of education program about discovery.191
This program would be a “form of discipline” that would
“provid[e] . . . opportunities to correct the types of mistakes that
landed them [there].”192 This is a strange suggestion, though, because
it applies after the fact, after the bad deed has already been done. Any
education program like this should instead be attended before the
discovery abuse happens, to prevent it from happening, rather than
after the fact. Further, this suggestion still lacks the uniformity,
predictability, and efficiency that a good solution should provide.
Once a framework for sanctions is adopted, though, education can
perhaps be a type of sanction imposed under those defined
guidelines.193
Further, a mere education program would simply not be as
effective as defined discipline and sanctions would be.
[T]he real, imminent prospect of discipline would impact a lawyer’s
personal interests, thus influencing how the lawyer interprets
information and makes decisions about discovery conduct. It may
only take the imposition of discipline in a case or two in the judge’s
court for the word to spread and attorneys to adjust their
conduct.194

A system imposing discipline and sanctions, rather than one imposing
an education program, would serve to remind attorneys that it is their
responsibility to take the lead on discovery and do it correctly.195
4. Local disciplinary rules should be amended.
Perhaps each state’s disciplinary procedures should be amended
or re-written whole cloth to provide a simpler and clearer disciplinary
process with fewer procedural barriers.196 New procedures could even
allow the court to address the misconduct “as part of a pending case
rather than referring the case to the court’s disciplinary system.”197
KU8M] (“Separation-of-powers principles constrain lawmakers from enacting legislation
that would affect how courts rule or undermine their lifetime appointments.”).
191 Schaefer, supra note 20, at 39.
192 Id.
193 On a practical level, too, mandating a continuing legal education program would
be challenging to enforce.
194 Schaefer, supra note 20, at 30.
195 Id. at 31.
196 Id. at 39.
197 Id.
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This is not a bad suggestion, because it would provide more
predictability for judges and attorneys. Amended rules that allow
misconduct to be addressed in the pending case would also serve the
goal of efficiency and would drastically decrease satellite litigations.
However, merely amending state rules doesn’t provide any uniformity.
Unless all states adopt the same new disciplinary rules, it’s likely that
states that amend their disciplinary rules will all adopt different
standards, which will continue to lead to different outcomes for similar
cases across districts. Imposing sanctions that could impact an
attorney’s life and “livelihood” by threatening real-life consequences
will hopefully incentivize attorneys to conduct themselves
appropriately in the discovery process.198
5. Disciplinary referrals for attorney misconduct should be
mandated.
A final solution suggests that judges must refer attorneys to the
state disciplinary authorities whenever an attorney abuses the discovery
process, or when an attorney is actually sanctioned.199 The issue with
this solution is “deciding what conduct should trigger mandatory
reporting under an amended rule.”200 States could specify exactly what
conduct would trigger reporting, but this again leads to disuniformity
and a likelihood that each state defines triggering conduct in a
different way. Further, it necessarily leads to satellite litigation, which
contradicts the goal of efficiency.
C. Addressing Arguments Against Imposing a Uniform System of Attorney
Sanctions
Some scholars have voiced concerns about imposing a system to
sanction attorneys for misconduct. They argue that too much
discipline will cause attorneys to be cautious—to the detriment of their
client. Or, discipline will increase discovery costs. And if electronic
information can often be recovered, why is a disciplinary system
necessary at all? Others believe e-discovery spoliation happens so
infrequently that it’s not worth adopting a new standard addressing it.
These objections, however, ignore the seriousness of attorney
involvement in e-discovery spoliation.

198 Id. at 32.
199 Id. at 41–42; see supra Part III (listing the authorities that courts have used in the
past to impose sanctions on attorneys).
200 Schaefer, supra note 20, at 41.
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1. Discipline will cause attorneys to be more cautious in their work.
“Some may be concerned that discipline for discovery misconduct
could cause some attorneys to be overly cautious in their advocacy, to
the detriment of their clients.”201 This concern, however, is meritless
because any attorney engaging in e-discovery misconduct is certainly
not being a good advocate, and any misconduct is certainly a detriment
to their clients. “Such conduct has never been recognized as
appropriate advocacy.”202 If anything, sanctions should have the
opposite effect of deterrence and spurring attorneys to be more
careful in their work to be better advocates for their clients.
2. There is no point in addressing spoliation of ESI when the
information is recoverable.
Since it is difficult to truly delete electronic evidence forever,
much destroyed or altered evidence can still be recovered.203 However,
even if evidence can be recovered, the point is not the recoverability
of the evidence; the point is that the evidence was destroyed or altered
in the first place. The ultimate issue is attorney involvement in the
spoliation of evidence, and that needs to be addressed, regardless of
whether the original evidence can be recovered. It is therefore
important to ensure that attorneys are properly sanctioned and
deterred from abusing the discovery process in the next case. A
uniform system granting courts clear authority to sanction attorneys
for e-discovery abuse would easily address this issue.
3. A new rule authorizing sanctions will increase discovery costs.
A new federal Rule authorizing sanctions may scare parties into
over-preserving information, leading to skyrocketing discovery costs.
Admittedly, this is a real concern.204 However, the hope is that a new
Rule authorizing attorney sanctions will remind attorneys of their
obligation to stay up-to-date on technological developments and
understand their clients’ IT systems so that they properly are
preserving evidence and therefore avoiding sanctions. Any sanctions
beyond the failure to preserve evidence, such as aiding in the
destruction or altering of ESI, are certainly deserved and do not cause
201 Id. at 27.
202 Id. at 28.
203 Van Namen, supra note 31, at 562.
204 The best way to address increased discovery costs probably involves arguing for
more specific discovery requirements in FRCP 26 or requiring courts and attorneys to
discuss discovery more clearly in the pretrial conference and the scheduling order. Such a
discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
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increased discovery costs. The only potential for increased discovery
costs comes with the failure to properly preserve evidence, which will
hopefully not be a problem if attorneys are reminded in this Rule of
their obligation to fully understand clients’ IT systems.
4. Attorney e-discovery misconduct is so rare that it is not worth
creating a new rule to address it.
This argument is a misconception. Examples of attorney misconduct are many.205 The examples only grow if one considers the fact
that attorneys are ultimately responsible for all aspects of e-discovery
and preservation of evidence, so almost any e-discovery misconduct by
the client will also mean that there was misconduct by the attorney.206
Almost any failure to properly preserve evidence, even if directly
traceable to the client’s conduct, is still the lawyer’s responsibility, so
the client should not be the only one bearing any sanctions for such
misconduct.207 Further, understanding the recent growth of technology and the prevalence of ESI means greater opportunities for
misconduct that will create a big problem if not addressed. Maybe this
means that the system should be more lenient on attorneys because
ESI is too changeable and too easy to mishandle. This is not a
convincing argument, though, when argued in light of the obligation
attorneys have to understand technology and competently handle
ESI.208
Even though there is plenty of caselaw illustrating e-discovery
abuse, there are likely many more examples of attorney misconduct
that are not made public. This may be because under the current
regime, other attorneys and judges are relied on to report any
misconduct, but attorneys are hesitant to file such reports.209
Additionally, attorney discipline is a rather private matter, and any
complaints that are made are often made confidentially, so it’s

205 See supra Part II.
206 See id.
207 This is not to say, however, that there are no cases where it’s appropriate to sanction
only the client for an e-discovery violation that had nothing to do with the lawyer. A lawyer
should not automatically be sanctioned for every instance of e-discovery abuse; a court must
still go through the framework defined by 37(g) to determine whether sanctions for
attorneys are appropriate in each case. See, e.g., Resnik v. Coulson, No. 17-CV-676, 2019 WL
1434051, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2019) (In this case, a lawyer wasn’t sanctioned because it
was the client alone who chose to download several data wiping programs, which resulted
in a deletion of evidence. Under the 37(g) framework, the lawyer also would not have been
sanctioned, since he played no part in the spoliation of evidence.).
208 See supra Part II (discussing attorney obligations in ESI).
209 See supra Part III.
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impossible to see the full picture of all disciplinary actions.210
Ultimately, because there’s no uniform system available to handle
misconduct, it’s not hard to imagine that some misconduct goes
unreported.
CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, “electronic discovery, and the facts it brings
to light, is worth protecting.”211 With new technology comes new
discoverable evidence and new opportunities for e-discovery
misconduct. An attorney must respond to these changes by being
proactive in preserving relevant data when litigation is reasonably
anticipated, and any failure to properly preserve data or to properly
counsel the client about how to preserve ESI falls squarely on the
lawyer. However, courts have been reluctant to impose sanctions for
attorneys because they do not have any reliable source of authority to
base those sanctions on. The local rules are inconsistent, the FRCP
does not authorize courts to impose sanctions on attorneys for ediscovery misconduct, and courts can no longer use their inherent
authority. The best solution that would provide notice, predictability,
efficiency, and uniformity to the federal court system is to add a Rule
to the FRCP, the system all federal courts have followed since the
1930s.

210
211

Schaefer, supra note 20, at 19–20.
Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, supra note 18, at 135.
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